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ABSTRACT
The present work proposes the use of social media as a tool for
better understanding the relationship between a journalists’ social
network and the content they produce. Specifically, we ask: what
is the relationship between the ideological leaning of a journalist’s
social network on Twitter and the news content he or she produces?
Using a novel dataset linking over 500,000 news articles produced
by 1,000 journalists at 25 different news outlets, we show a modest
correlation between the ideologies of who a journalist follows on
Twitter and the content he or she produces. This research can
provide the basis for greater self-reflection among media members
about how they source their stories and how their own practice may
be colored by their online networks. For researchers, the findings
furnish a novel and important step in better understanding the
construction of media stories and the mechanics of how ideology
can play a role in shaping public information.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Discussions of news media bias have dominated public and elite
discourse in recent years, but analyses of various forms of journalis-
tic bias and subjectivity—whether through framing, agenda-setting,
or false balance, or stereotyping, sensationalism, and the exclusion
of marginalized communities—have been conducted by communi-
cations and media scholars for generations [24]. In both research
and popular discourse, an increasing area of focus has been ideo-
logical bias, and how partisan-tinged media may help explain other
societal phenomena, such as political polarization [2, 14, 28].
The mechanisms that produce such biases in journalistic out-
put, including ideological slant, have been heavily explored at the
structural, organizational, and individual levels [11, 13, 31, 36]. To
date, however, researchers have only been able to study patterns
of newsroom work, and its connection to the construction of sto-
ries and news agendas, through analytical tools such as surveys,
newsroom ethnography, and content analysis. While these tools
are vital, they limit the scale of the analysis and/or are unable to
fully capture the social nature of the work of journalism.
In contrast, online social media presents a coarse-grained but
large-scale tool for exploring the practice of journalism and the
social worlds of those within it. Social media allows us to measure
behavior at granularities more precise than previous methodologies
[49]. Networks of influence can be quantified, and information
flows can be understood in relation to embeddeddness within online
social communities [34]. Social media is important more specifically
in the journalistic context because journalists’ use of it continues
to grow rapidly. Across multiple surveys, journalists report using
social media regularly, and microblogging (Twitter) is an especially
popular practice that journalists perceive to be instrumental in the
profession [35]. For example, 54.8% of journalists report regular use
of microblogs [45], while 56.2% say they frequently find additional
information of various kinds on social media and 54.1% say they
commonly find sources there.
In its rapid rise in popularity amongst journalists, social media
(and Twitter in particular) not only provides a new platform on
which to advance existing practices, they also change the dynamics
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of news media production and audience-consumer behavior. Con-
sequently, social media presents both a new opportunity to study
existing journalistic practices and raises new questions and work-
flows that demand further inquiry. As journalists spend more time
in online communities and as audiences migrate there for news, it
is imperative to understand how emerging dynamics are unfolding
regarding how news is produced, consumed, and engaged with.
The present work focuses on one specific dimension of social
media use by journalists—namely, how the content a journalist
consumes and engages with on social media may be ideologically
tied to the content he or she produces. In terms of the construction
of news stories, two dimensions of journalistic routines might be
seen as particularly consequential in news content production and
therefore key areas of focus in any study of journalistic social media
use: source-related duties; and research-related duties. Journalists
report that Twitter’s value in news workflow is “significantly tied
to the platform’s use for querying followers, conducting research
and activities associated with contacting sources” [35].
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the content a journalist
sources on Twitter may impact the content he or she produces.
Here, we focus specifically on ideological dimensions of content.
Our main research question therefore asks: what is the relationship
between the ideological leaning of a journalist’s social network on
Twitter and the news content he or she produces?
To answer this question, we begin with a novel and unique
dataset of journalists linking their Twitter accounts to the articles
they write. We then develop straightforward measures of 1) the
ideological leaning of each journalist as determined by who they
follow on Twitter and 2) the ideological leaning of each journal-
ist as determined by the articles that they write. After informally
evaluating our measures, we then show that there is a modest but
significant correlation between them, even when controlling for the
outlet a journalist writes for. This result implies that even within
particular outlets (e.g. within the set of political reporters at the
New York Times), there is a relationship between the ideology of a
reporter’s online sources and the content they produce offline.
This study is exploratory and cannot assess causation or fully
account for confounding variables such as journalists’ beats (which
may demand deeper embeddedness in specific ideological commu-
nities for the purposes of sourcing and research). However, the
findings furnish a vital first step in evaluating emerging dynamics
in the production of information in an online networked environ-
ment. Further, because we can measure the universe of journalists’
social networks and correlate this with their off-platform publi-
cations, this study affords a unique window into the relationship
between online and offline worlds, a larger research domain that
remains not yet well understood [8].
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Journalism and Social Media
The work of journalism is highly governed by routines [37]. Emerg-
ing work on how social media is being incorporated into these
routines suggests that use of platforms like Twitter can become
deeply embedded—indeed, “normalized”—and cross many dimen-
sions of sourcing, information-gathering, and production of stories
[23]. Although active participation on social media platforms by
individual journalists may have under-appreciated negative costs
(e.g. diminished audience impressions of professionalism), most
media organizations now actively encourage journalistic activity
on such platforms, within limits of organizations’ policies [26].
Journalists also use social media for quasi-marketing functions,
a phenomenon that may result in greater responsiveness to feed-
back from social media. This requires a renegotiation of traditional
notions of objectivity and distance from audiences. Problems with
the underlying business model of journalism and massive declines
in advertising revenue have prompted a diverse set of efforts to
engage new audiences and generate online revenue streams. Indeed,
journalists may be increasingly “balancing editorial autonomy and
the other norms that have institutionalized journalism, on one hand,
and the increasing influence exerted by the audience—perceived to
be the key for journalism’s survival—on the other” [40].
Indeed, social media audience responses to stories and the as-
sociated analytics have been found to modify newsroom behavior,
suggesting that social media can have powerful effects on how
newsrooms prioritize information [25]. Traditionally, journalists
have been seen in a hierarchical “gatekeeping” role, with power
over audiences and sources regarding story selection and prioriti-
zation of public agenda items. However, research has found that,
because audience interest can now be quantified through online
data and newsroom priorities optimized accordingly, “digital audi-
ences are driving a subsidiary gatekeeping process that picks up
where mass media leave off, as they share news items with friends
and colleagues” [25]. While the present work focuses on the sources
that a journalist can derive from Twitter, and thus does not consider
directly the effect of audience feedback on content production, this
prior work on the impact of social media interactions and journalis-
tic content provides an expectation for a correlation between online
sources and offline content.
A significant amount of more empirical work also exists study-
ing the interrelationships between news media and Twitter. This
literature has shown how content in the news and on Twitter coe-
volve [7, 15, 22], and has developed novel methods of linking news
articles to tweets about them [41] and linking both news media and
tweets to the same event(s) [44]. Scholars have also considered how
the sharing, and even simply viewing, of news media can expose
partisan biases in news consumption [21].
Our efforts differ from this prior work in two ways. First, prior
work mostly focuses on how news content is consumed and spread
through social media, or how news agencies choose which content
to produce based on social media. In contrast, we consider how
the ideological skew of the content consumed by specific journal-
ists on Twitter is associated with the ideology of the content that
they generate. Second, we focus specifically on journalists, rather
than the broader Twittersphere. Here, our efforts are similar to [1],
who develop a method to identify journalists on Twitter. However,
we take a different approach to identifying journalists on Twitter,
because we would like to link them to the articles they write.
2.2 Inferring Ideological Leanings
2.2.1 From Twitter. Significant attention has been devoted to
extracting political meanings from Twitter, from election prediction
(see [5] for a nice review) to predicting ideological leanings of users
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[12, 17, 20, 39, 43, 47] to predicting which political party a user is
registered for [4]. In general, such work shows that Twitter users
display their political leanings in a variety of ways, in both the
content that they tweet [12, 17] and whom they follow [4].
The present work focuses on extracting a measure of ideology
from the accounts that a journalist follows. Our efforts are most
directly related to those of [3], who develop a Bayesian method for
this problem, and [19], who give a better solution to same Bayesian
model. Their work, like ours, relies on the fact that follower relation-
ships are ideologically situated; for example, left-leaning individuals
tend to follow more left-leaning accounts. Their model starts with
a set of approximately 4M Twitter accounts as rows of a matrix.
Columns of the matrix are then defined by a set of around 400
“elite political users.” A cell i, j in the matrix is set to 1 if user i
follows elite account j. The authors then use an ideal point model
(a Bayesian latent-variable model with a single latent dimension) to
infer ideological positions of both users and the elite political users
based, roughly, on a decomposition of this matrix. The authors
find that ideologies inferred for elite political users match more
traditional measures of ideology by comparing official accounts for
congresspeople to traditional measures of partisan ideology.
Our method differs from [3] in that we are only interested in in-
ferring ideology of a set of users (journalists). Consequently, we are
willing to provide a significant amount of additional information (i.e.
to allow our model to “know” existing conventional partisanship
measures rather than trying to infer them) to provide as accurate a
measure as possible of ideological positions of journalists.
2.2.2 From Text. While ideological detection from Twitter is,
necessarily, a relatively new field, the scaling of ideology based
on text data has a longer and more varied history (see [30] for a
more historical perspective). In general, approaches to scaling text
for ideology require a set of text articles pre-tagged for ideology,
for example, a set of books authored by individuals with known
ideological leanings [38]. This text can then be used to determine a
set of polarized terms [30] or n-grams [38] that are highly polar-
ized. These terms or n-grams can then be applied to new texts to
determine the ideology of the new text, although in some cases the
ideological skew and ideology of texts can be jointly inferred [33].
An important limitation of approaches that scale text for ide-
ology in this way, however, is that ideology is often expressed
through particular frames, where ideology invokes particular sen-
timents towards a set of bipartisan issues. As others have noted,
in such cases keyword-based models like those used here may not
fully capture ideological leanings. Instead, scholars have recently
developed novel approaches for detecting and extracting frames
from text, largely via Bayesian latent variable (i.e. “topic model
like”) approaches [9, 33, 42]. While such methods are an impor-
tant avenue of future work, we here restrict ourselves to a simpler,
ideology-based n-gram approach for ease of interpretability and
acknowledge the potential limitations of doing so.
3 DATA
3.1 Journalist Data
We began with a set of 25 news outlets chosen with the goal of
finding a relatively balanced sample of news sources from across
Outlet N Outlet N
Heavily Right Leaning Heavily Left Leaning
RealClearPolitics 7 Huffington Post 68
Washington Times 11 Vox 16
Breitbart 7 Politico 94
The Hill 32 New Yorker 13
National Review 10
Right Leaning Left Leaning
New York Post 19 USA TODAY 45
Oklahoman 12 Bloomberg 107
Tennessean 9 BuzzFeed 57
Wall Street Journal 82 New York Times 190
Arizona Republic 22 Washington Post 143
Florida Times-Union 13
Weekly Standard 9
Dallas Morning News 25
New York Daily News 25
Orange County Register 12
Las Vegas Review-Journal 14
Table 1: A list of the 25 news outlets used in the present
work. The columns labeled N give the number of journalists
from each outlet that met our criteria for inclusion. Outlets
are broken up by traditional expectations of (heavily or not)
left/right leaning content
the political spectrum. An initial set of outlets was chosen from a
Pew Research Center study [29] that looked into the ideological
configuration of the media audience. From the Pew list we selected
outlets whose media format was either newspaper, magazine or
blogs. Finding the resulting list to be skewed toward liberal news
outlets, we applied our domain knowledge to add more right-wing
news outlets to the sample.
For each outlet, we then extracted all journalists associated with
the outlet according to MuckRack1—an online platform for public
relations professionals interested in tracking news media. Jour-
nalists who were identified by MuckRack as writers of Arts and
Entertainment, Food and Dining, or other non-political sections
were excluded from our sample. All remaining journalists were
assumed to be political journalists, insofar as they covered topics
that had a public affairs dimension.
For each political journalist, we then obtained both their Twitter
handle and a list of their published articles from MuckRack. Jour-
nalists with fewer than 100 published articles were excluded from
the sample, as well as those that did not have an accessible Twitter
account. The set of 25 outlets studied, along with the number of
journalists we considered from each outlet, is shown in Table 1.
Additionally, we give a loose categorization of the news article
into those that are heavily or slightly right or left-leaning. After
cleaning and filtering steps described, we were left with a total of
1,047 journalists, who wrote a combined set of 502,340 articles.
3.2 Congressional Data
We use three datasets derived from members of Congress. First, in
order to determine the political affiliation and official social media
accounts for members of Congress, we leverage a database linking
1http://www.muckrack.com
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congresspeople to their official Twitter handles2. Second, as we
discuss below, it is also useful to have a measure of the degree to
which each congressperson leans left or right. For this, we take
DW Nominate scores [32] of each candidate provided by GovTrack3.
DW Nominate scores are a standard measure in political science
of the position of each congressperson on a [0,1] interval (which
we translate to [-.5,.5]). They are measured by extracting a latent
ideological dimension derived from congressional voting patterns.
Finally, in order to scale newspaper articles on an ideological
scale, we rely on public statements made by congresspeople to
determine ideologically situated language. We extract a set of the
last 150,000 public statements (dating back to mid-2015) made by
members of Congress captured on thewebsite VoteSmart.org4. Prior
work on the same dataset has shown this corpus to be useful for
understanding politicized language [42].
4 METHODOLOGY
Our focus is on understanding the ideological relationship between
journalists’ social network and the news they generate. In this
section, we describe how we construct measures of journalists’
ideology as represented by 1) who they follow on Twitter and 2)
the news articles they write. These measures serve as proxies, re-
spectively, for the ideology of journalists as represented by their
network ties and their news outputs. We then take these proxies to
study the underlying phenomena of interest.
4.1 Ideology of Twitter networks
Perhaps the simplest method to determining ideology of a Twitter
user from their following relations, as has been done elsewhere [10],
is to count the number of Democrat vs. Republican congresspeople
the user follows. However, there are many Twitter accounts that
do not follow congresspeople. More importantly, many accounts
that users follow that are not congresspeople are still indicative
of political ideology. This is particularly true of those on the far-
right of the political spectrum. We therefore develop a method that
leverages known information about congresspeople only indirectly,
through a more complete picture of the accounts an individual
follows.We first project journalists, the congressional accounts they
follow, and other accounts that are strong indicators of political
preferences, into a shared latent space. We then use known ideology
scores of congressional accounts to project points in this latent
space onto an ideological dimension.
We first follow [3] and construct a matrix of users for whom
we wish to infer ideology based on follower relationships (rows)
and the elite they follow (columns). We define elite accounts as
any account for which we have a DW-Nominate score (n=502) or
any account followed by more than 2% of all rows (n=2,549). The
rows of our matrix are defined by two distinct sets of Twitter users.
First, we include the full set of journalists we are interested in
studying. Second, we include a set of 12,001 highly politically active
Twitter users. We determine the set of politically active users by
first linking Twitter accounts to public voter registration data, as
is done in [4]. We consider an account to be politically active if
2https://github.com/unitedstates/congress-legislators
3https://www.govtrack.us/about/analysis
4http://votesmart.org
it is both a) a registered Democrat or Republican and b) follows
at least 3 congressional accounts. Politically active accounts are
useful for two reasons. First, they can be used to ensure that our
methodology correctly exposes ideological differences in following
relations between left and right-leaning accounts. Second, they
encourage the latent space representation of the matrix to include
a strong ideological component.
Having constructed this matrix, we then use singular value de-
composition (SVD) to project both the rows and the columns into a
shared low-dimensional latent space. We follow common practice
in the word embedding literature and first transform the matrix to
represent positive pointwise mutual information (PPMI) [27]. We
then run SVD with k = 5 latent dimensions—note that qualitative
results presented are robust to varying k beyond this, but that five
latent dimensions was found to be enough for the present work.
We then construct a regression model that determines how ide-
ology is represented in this low-dimensional space. We regress
DW-Nominate scores of congressional accounts (a subset of the
matrix columns) on the 5-dimensional representation of these ac-
counts produced by the prior step. The regression model we train
is a generalized additive model (GAM) [48], and explains 83% of the
variance. Finally, because the rows and columns of the matrix are
represented in the same latent space, we can use the parameters
of this regression model to project the rows onto this same ideo-
logical spectrum. This results in a final score for each journalist of
the ideological leanings of the accounts they follow, as well as an
ideological score for each of the politically active accounts.
With respect to evaluation, we are interested in understanding
how well our model captures ideological structure in the rows of
our matrix. In Section 5, we therefore assess how well our model
captures party registration differences in politically active accounts,
and how well it matches a well-known ideological score of 500
websites, which include domains for many outlets studied here,
derived from Facebook data [2].
4.2 Ideology from News Content
Our methodology for determining ideological slant of journalists
based on the articles they write is completed in two steps that
lean heavily on the methodology proposed in [30]. We first extract
phrases indicative of a left or right leaning ideology, and then we
score journalists based on the number of times they express these
terms in their articles. We discuss each of these pieces in more
detail below.
4.2.1 Finding Ideologically Informative Terms. Our first step is
to construct a set of phrases (here, terms) that are representative
of a strong left or right leaning ideology. For this purpose, we use
the corpus of 150,000 congressional public statements derived from
VoteSmart. The terms extracted from each statement are obtained
using the recently developed NPFST algorithm [18], which extracts
multiword phrases via part-of-speech patterns. Table 2 below dis-
plays some of the terms extracted.
After extracting terms, we construct a single bag-of-words rep-
resentation for each congressperson from all public statements
written individually by him or her. Following [30], we then score
each term using a smoothed log-odds ratio of the frequency with
which the term was used by Democrats versus Republicans. Mathe-
matically, the score we extracted for a term t , s(t), is calculated using
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Equation 1, where yDt (yRt ) represents the number of Democrats
(Republicans) who used the term t at least once, λ is a smoothing pa-
rameter5, |T | is the number of terms considered, and |D | and |R | are
the number of Democrats and Republicans considered, respectively
(|D | = 229, |R | = 276, |T | = 642, 990).
s(t) = log( y
R
t + λ
|R | + (|T | − 1)λ − yRt
)− log( y
D
t + λ
|D | + (|T | − 1)λ − yDt
) (1)
Equation 1 discounts the frequency with which terms were used
by each congressperson. While in the future there may be useful
ways to incorporate these values, we chose to construct ourmeasure
based solely on the number of congresspeople who expressed each
term in order to construct a set of terms with broad usage across
the entire party, rather than by any particular subset within a party
(e.g. the Freedom caucus).
After scoring all terms, we extract the top 100 most left-leaning
(negative) and right-leaning (positive) terms as measured by s(t).
We then follow [38] and use domain expertise to narrow these sets
down into thosemost indicative of ideology.We found this step to be
necessary due to the important differences between congressional
statements and news articles. Specifically, congressional statements
tended to be more polarized in what kinds of news they would
discuss (e.g. Democrats were much more likely to discuss mass
shootings), while news agencies were more likely to discuss all
forms of news but to have a particular slant towards them. While
this points to future work in modeling both slant and ideological
term selection, we found that domain knowledge could determine
concepts that were expected to be indicative of ideological leaning
if used at all, regardless of slant.
From the top 100 terms found via scoring using Equation 1, we
extracted 57 right-leaning terms and 43 left leaning ones. In order
to ensure we had the same number of terms for each side, we then
filled in an additional 14 left-leaning terms from the following 50
most highly left-leaning terms. The full set of terms used, alongwith
the code and data necessary to reproduce analyses, are available as
part of the code release at the link given above.
4.2.2 Determining Ideology of Journalists. Given sets of left and
right-leaning terms from above, we then determine an ideological
score for each journalist, s(j), via the (smoothed) log-odds of the
journalist using a left-leaning term as opposed to a right-leaning
term across all of his or her articles:
s(j) = log(
yRj + 1
yDj + 1
) (2)
For analyses involving journalists scored for ideology on text,
we restrict ourselves to the 648 journalists who wrote at least ten
articles with more than 200 words and who expressed at least one
ideological term in their writing.
5 RESULTS
Here, we first provide informal evaluations of our methods for
Twitter and news content. We then consider our primary research
question in Section 5.3.
5Or equivalently, a Dirichlet prior; λ = 1 for all experiments here
(a) (b)
Figure 1: a) On the x-axis, the average weight of all journal-
ists for the given news organization (y-axis) on the latent di-
mension most correlated with ideology in the Twitter data.
Points are colored by ideology of the agencies website by [2]
(blue is more left-leaning, red more right-leaning). Where
no estimate is available, the point is colored grey. b) Distri-
bution of predicted ideology scores for registeredDemocrats
and registered Republicans in our sample.
5.1 Twitter Ideology
Figures 1a) and b) present two informal evaluations of our method
for extracting ideology from the accounts a Twitter user follows.
Each provides evidence that the method we use does a reasonable
job extracting the desired quantity.
In Figure 1a), the y-axis defines the set of news outlets considered
in this study, and the x-axis gives the average score of all journalists
for that outlet on the latent dimension our regression model iden-
tifies as the most correlated with ideology. Points for each outlet
are colored with an estimate of the ideology of that outlet’s audi-
ence from a well-known prior work on partisan Facebook sharing
behavior [2]. Outlets not measured in the prior study are colored
grey. Figure a) shows a strong relationship (Pearson correlation
of .92) between ideological measurements of previous work and
the proposed method. Further, we are able to score several new
outlets on the partisan scale in a way that matches prior intuitions
of ideological leanings.
In Figure 1b), we plot the distribution of ideology scores for the
12,0001 politically active users we infer ideology for, split by the
set of accounts registered as Democrats and those registered as
Republicans. Again, a clear partisan division, well-known to exist
on Twitter (e.g. [3]), emerges from our analysis, giving us further
confidence in the quality of our measurements.
Finally, it is also interesting to explore how the method ranks
specific journalists ideologically based on who they follow. We
found that journalists with the most heavily right-leaning follow-
erships are at traditionally right-leaning outlets such as the Wash-
ington Times, Breitbart and The Hill. Similarly, journalists follow-
ing the most left-leaning accounts tend to be from left-leaning
outlets. However, there are interesting exceptions. For example,
among the journalists following the most right-leaning accounts
are Eliana Johnson (Politico), Jeremy Peters (New York Times) and
James Hohmann (Washington Post).
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Top Left-Leaning Terms Top Right-Leaning Terms
lgbt bureaucrats
voting rights obamacare
lgbt community overreach
gun safety waters of the united
comprehensive immigration
reform
waters of the united states
equal pay state sponsor
comprehensive immigration burdensome regulations
voting rights act deal with iran
minimum wage reconciliation act
mass shooting mandates
marriage equality executive overreach
sexual orientation separation of powers
violence prevention nuclear deal with iran
equal work detainees
orientation illegal immigrants
gun violence state sponsor of terrorism
bigotry sponsor of terrorism
Table 2: The top 15 left and right-leaning terms as deter-
mined by our scaling method. Terms in bold were selected
for the final list of 114 terms (57 left-leaning and 57 right-
leaning) to scale news articles
While any evaluation of these results is largely subjective, we
note that they were produced by data scientists with no knowl-
edge of these journalists. When evaluated by paper authors with a
journalist bent, however, it was acknowledged that Jeremy Peters
frequently covers Republicans, that Eliana Johnston is a well-known
conservative writer and that James Hohmann now regularly writes
analytical articles about the Trump administration. These observa-
tions provide further face validity for the method and generated
new avenues of understanding of how ideology of a reporters con-
tent intersects with their online source environment.
5.2 News Content Ideology
Table 2 presents the 15 words identified as being the most left-
leaning (left column) and right leaning (right column) as measured
by s(t), and give face validation for our approach. Table 2 also shows
the utility of using a phrase-based generator [18]—n-grams like
“separation of powers” and “voting rights act” are much more useful
and descriptive measures of partisan views and topical foci than,
e.g., “separation” or “voting”.
In addition to assessing the quality of the partisan terms extracted
from congressional statements, we consider how well these terms
can be used to identify partisanship of journalistic content. Figure 2
shows, as with the Twitter measure, that far-right leaning outlets
are clearly separable from the other news outlets studied using our
measure. However, we also see that across all other outlets, both the
prior measure of partisanship (from [2]) and our expert intuitions
given in Table 1 aremoreweakly correlatedwith ideological content
of news articles than with Twitter networks. As noted, this may
be driven in part by simplistic method we use to identify ideology,
which does not do enough to identify framing of general issues.
Additionally, it is possible that the recent shifts in the political
landscape of U.S. politics led more conservative-leaning outlets to
skew more liberally on politics (though perhaps not, for example,
on economics, which we do not study here).
Figure 2: Average ideology score of all journalists (x-axis) for
a news organization (y-axis) as determined by the articles
those journalistswrote. Points are colored by ideology of the
agencies’ website as given in [2] (blue is left-leaning, red is
right-leaning). Grey indicates no such estimate exists.
Despite these limitations, our approach to identifying ideology
of news articles is grounded in a significant literature that suggests
partisan terms can be used to identify at least some level of par-
tisanship in writing [30]. Further, results here do align outlets at
political extremes correctly relative to each other (e.g. Huffington
Post and Vox on the left, Breitbart and National Review on the
right). Consequently, we proceed to our main research question
with confidence that our approach is able to identify some level of
partisan ideology from text.
5.3 Comparing Twitter and News
Figure 3 compares themean Twitter-based (x-axis) and news content-
based (y-axis) ideological scores of journalists for each outlet, and
shows a clear positive relationship between the two—the more left-
leaning accounts the journalists for a given outlet follow, the more
left-leaning their content tends to be.
Beyond this general observation, two points are of note in Fig-
ure 3. First, the clear break between the heavily right-leaning outlets
(in the top right) and all other media outlets in both Twitter and
news content provides further evidence of the rapid disintegration
of the “center-right” [6], leading to a new level of extreme right-
wing philosophy impacting political dialog. Second, we see that
the three most established news agencies we study—the New York
Times,Washington Post and theWall Street Journal—have largely
left-leaning Twitter networks but produce fairly ideologically neu-
tral or even fairly conservative content. This result suggests that
the “left-leaning bias” these media sources have been accused of is
likely due not only to how ideological content is framed but also to
a purely social “filter bubble” that segregates journalists at these
outlets from more right-leaning communities.
We now turn to the more direct question of how, controlling for
biases induced by the outlet a journalist works for, the ideology of
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Figure 3: Each point is a news outlet. On the y-axis, the av-
erage ideological rating of all journalists at the outlet as es-
timated by the articles they wrote. On the y-axis, the aver-
age ideological rating of all journalists at the outlet as deter-
mined by whom they follow on Twitter
Figure 4: Regression coefficients for a linear model predict-
ing textual ideology from Twitter ideology, controlling for
outlet. Coefficients are shownwith 95% confidence intervals;
only coefficients whose 95% intervals do not cross zero are
plotted
the content a journalist produces is correlated with the ideology of
the accounts he or she follows on Twitter. To do so, we run a linear
regression where the outcome variable is s(j), and the independent
variables are the outlet a reporter works for as well as the ideological
leaning of the accounts the journalist follows. For the former set
of variables, we use Politico as the reference case. For the latter
value, we standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by
two standard deviations for ease of interpretation [16].
Figure 4 presents results for coefficients significant at p <.05,
and shows that the ideology of a journalist’s Twitter network is
moderately but significantly correlated with the ideology of the
content they produce, even when controlling for the outlet a jour-
nalist works for. An increase in two standard deviations in the
level of right-leaning content in a journalist’s Twitter network is
associated with an increase of .35 in production of right-leaning
content (s(j)). In other words, a journalist whose twitter feed is
mostly conservative is likely to produce content that is approxi-
mately one quarter of one standard deviation more conservative
than a journalist whose feed is mostly liberal.
6 DISCUSSION
While we find a clear correlation between the ideology of the jour-
nalist’s Twitter network and the ideology of his or her writing, a
closer inspection of specific journalists yields important exceptions.
For example, outliers such as David Sanger of the New York Times
focus heavily on national security andmilitary affairs. While Sanger
would not be characterized as particularly partisan by most media
observers, our analysis decisively places him amongst the most
right-leaning content producers, even though his Twitter network
is among the most left-leaning. Beyond Sanger, who is an extreme
outlier, there are a substantial number of journalists whose Twit-
ter networks lean left, but whose content focuses on right-leaning
topics.
Survey research continues to suggest that journalists as a whole
are more likely to be left-leaning [46]. The fact that journalists are
generally concentrated in metropolitan areas, which tend to vote
more liberally in elections, is plausibly a factor in many of their on-
line social networks skewing in the same ideological direction. Yet
the findings here give tentative evidence that professional codes of
impartiality may remain strong in journalistic culture, despite elite
criticisms, particularly from conservative commentators, that jour-
nalists are mostly liberals and therefore their professional output
must be biased. The relationship between social networks and work
output of journalists is complex and evolving, and the moderate
correlation and obvious exceptions found point to that reality.
Further, setting aside the specific nature of the correlations, the
research inquiry itself here can render general applications both in
the professional and academic fields of journalism. In considering
their professional practices, it is highly useful—indeed, essential—
that journalists should reflect critically on the patterns of informa-
tion they consume online and offline, and be more highly attuned
to how bias and assumptions can slip into their work. By being
more aware of what they are exposed to on Twitter, journalists
might more objectively become aware of how their sense of real-
ity is being shaped and how their understanding of the world is
framed by sources they follow. In this regard, future research might
employ survey methods to see how journalists’ impressions of their
own social networks, as well as their online sourcing and research
routines, differ from the empirical realities.
7 CONCLUSION
The present work provides what is to our knowledge the first empiri-
cal study of journalists’ online social networks and the connections
with professional output. In an era where issues of political po-
larization and media bias are increasingly front-and-center, these
connections between online social influence and the way public
information is produced are of major importance. The chief finding
presented is a significant, albeit moderate, correlation between the
ideological character of a journalist’s social network and ideological
dimensions of his or her published output, even when controlling
for the outlet for which the journalist writes. This result furnishes
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a crucial first step toward greater critical examination of emerging
patterns of media bias.
It is important to note, however, that the simplistic methods we
use have important limitations. More specifically, our approach
to extracting ideological leanings of Twitter accounts could be
extended to a more formally distantly supervised model based on
politically active users, rather than simply adding these accounts to
the matrix of journalists as we do here. Our approach to extracting
ideology from news articles should also be extended to more readily
consider how the phrases discussed in news articles are “spun” or
framed [9, 42]. Finally, while we provide informal validation of our
methods, a more formal evaluation step is necessary if they are to
be adopted for other purposes.
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